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1. Introduction 
Survey results published in 2009 by the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) of New South Wales1 reported that most public sector organisations in its 
jurisdiction have established integrity policies and procedures – or ‘organisational 
integrity systems’ (ICAC 2009).2
                                                 
1  The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was created by the ICAC Act 1988. Its aims 
are to protect the public interest, prevent breaches of public trust and guide the conduct of public officials. 
The ICAC has the authority to investigate any matter involving public sector corruption in NSW. 
  Despite this, many of the public inquiries conducted by 
the ICAC that find corrupt conduct often also find a failure to implement or enforce 
existing anti-corruption mechanisms in agencies. More recently an ICAC inquiry 
reported that similar patterns of repeated corrupt conduct had been pervasive in one 
government agency since the early 1990s despite being prohibited by organisational 
policy (ICAC 2008). These findings are also consistent with the anecdotal experience of 
integrity practitioners that public sector agencies are experiencing repeated workplace 
corruption despite the presence of apparently adequate organisational integrity systems. 
When workplace corruption is exposed, it may be professionally investigated and 
reforms to address the problems proposed and attempted, yet the same or similar 
workplace corruption reoccurs. As Barber suggests, ensuring successful delivery requires 
2  Organisational integrity systems are policy and operational frameworks that are intended to integrate an 
organisation’s anti-corruption strategies. They usually comprise standard elements including risk 
assessment, audit and investigation capacity, reporting, education and training, organisational controls and 
policies, administrative structures, leadership and communication.  
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a “long grind” of “steady, persistent implementation” and “gentle pressure, relentlessly 
applied” (Barber2008:112 and 119). 
 
This paper examines cases of low-level non-compliance in a municipal waste collection 
services and a state owned railway to identify some of the factors that could be 
contributing to reoccurring workplace corruption. The analysis suggests that a major 
factor in repeated workplace corruption is the failure to monitor and implement reforms 
recommended by investigations and existing organisational integrity systems. 
  
2.  Sutherland Shire Council Waste and Cleansing Services 
 
2005 Investigation3
Sutherland Shire Council is a large metropolitan local (or municipal) government area in 
southern Sydney, Australia. It has an annual budget of about AUD $220 million and 
employs about 1,400 staff. It is responsible for providing services to the local area such 
as planning/building controls, road construction, environmental management and 
cleaning/waste collection.  
 
 
In 2005 the council received a number of complaints about the service provided by its 
Waste and Cleansing Services for the collection of commercial waste from shops and 
businesses. These complaints were investigated by the council’s Internal Ombudsman. 
They included: 
• Cleansing Services collecting commercial waste from shops, restaurants and 
businesses that were not paying customers of the council. 
• Extra non-contracted waste being collected from council customers above the 
agreed amounts without extra payment. 
• Private bins or waste being collected from private residences. 
• Private waste being collected from the homes of council employees. 
• Cleansing Services employees using council vehicles to conduct private business 
such as moving furniture.  
• Some Cleansing Services employees receiving small amounts of cash or food 
and drinks from shops and businesses for collecting extra waste without any 
payment to the council.  
                                                 
3  This case study is based on material first presented in Canberra, Australia, at the Second Annual Ethical 
Leadership & Governance in the Public Sector conference. (Plibersek 2008) 
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Council’s Internal Ombudsman investigated the allegations including conducting 
surveillance of the Waste and Cleansing Services employees. The investigation found 
many of the allegations outlined above proven.4
 
 However, because the activities 
appeared to be infrequent and the evidence of systemic corruption was inconclusive the 
investigation was unable to make a finding of entrenched corruption. The investigation 
also demonstrated that the council’s comprehensive Code of Conduct and 
process/supervisory controls were inadequate in preventing the alleged corrupt conduct. 
Although corruption controls were generally in place, they were not observed by staff 
nor enforced by management. 
2007-2008 Investigation 
In 2007 further complaints were received that extra or unauthorised waste continued to 
be collected and that Sutherland’s waste employees continued to receive gifts/food or 
payments. These complaints suggested that the activity was more widespread than was 
first identified in 2005. As a result of these complaints a second investigation was made 
into the same area. In summary, the 2007-2008 investigation found the existence of the 
following activities. 
• Immediately after the 2005 investigation, the waste employees that were not 
implicated took it as a green light to continue their corrupt activities. Training in 
corruption prevention and the Code of Conduct was dismissed by many 
employees as being theoretical and not applicable to them. For these employees 
it was ‘business as usual’. 
• Waste truck drivers having a large organised network of business locations 
where added waste collection services were being provided for their own 
personal gain. 
• Demands that relief drivers undertake these added waste collections on corrupt 
employees’ behalf when they are off duty to maintain the unauthorised waste 
collections. 
• Evidence that if relief drivers refused to undertake these added unauthorised 
waste collections pressure was brought to bear on those drivers suggesting that 
their job depended on it. 
• Division of Cleansing Services employees into two factions, one involved in the 
corrupt behaviour and another which was aware of the behaviour but ‘looked the 
other way’.  
                                                 
4  Internal Ombudsman Sutherland Shire Council “Investigation into Cleansing Services” 2005 
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• Some corrupt employees were protected from being reported because of 
friendships outside work. 
• Rosters were prepared allocating like minded employees together. This ensured 
the continuation of the system of unauthorised waste collection and minimised 
the risk of these collections being reported by employees not involved. 
• Employees known to be opposed to unauthorised waste collections being 
threatened with disciplinary action or allocated to less favourable roles.  
 
The investigations by Sutherland Council in 2005, and by the ICAC into nearby 
Liverpool City Council (to be discussed below), identified a number of corruption risks 
in waste collection. However, the 2007 complaints concerning Sutherland’s Cleansing 
Services provided evidence of a further significant effect of low level corruption not 
previously identified. They demonstrated the contagious effect that low level corruption 
can have on the integrity and ability of a group to do its work efficiently.  
 
As noted above, the 2007 complaints uncovered two ‘factions’ of employees. One group 
of employees participated and maintained the system of unauthorised waste collection. 
This group favoured its members wherever possible, particularly by altering work 
rosters. Those outside the group were bullied or ostracised and casual staff were 
pressured to join the unauthorised waste collection. Any supervisors or employees that 
were not involved did not report it but tolerated the behaviour. This led to a loss of these 
supervisors’ authority and their ability to effectively direct staff to do Cleansing Services 
authorised work. It also allowed a damaging public perception to develop amongst some 
of Council’s waste customers that Cleansing Services employees were corrupt and that 
Council management was unable to control corruption. 
 
The 2007 complaints made it clear that despite the program of education and training, the 
corrupt behaviour had continued and seemed to worsen. Thus the training and education 
in corruption prevention and the Code of Conduct together with existing management 
controls were proven to be ineffective to prevent the reoccurring corrupt behaviour. In 
fact, unknown to the Internal Ombudsman or senior management, after the corruption 
prevention training had finished, the waste employees still did not view their own 
behaviour as corrupt but as a part of doing their job or just good customer service. 
Because of the relatively low level of gifts/food/money involved and as long as the 
garbage was collected, the waste employees and their immediate supervisors continued 
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to treat this behaviour as acceptable and a minor issue not requiring any remedial action. 
Other recommendations that had been allocated to the Waste and Cleansing Services 
managers had not been implemented, nor had any senior manager checked 
implementation. 
 
With the evidence uncovered by the 2007-2008 investigation that the corrupt behaviour 
present in 2005 had reoccurred – and possibly worsened, the paramount issue now 
became: What different initiatives or reforms could prevent continual reoccurrence of 
these same issues? 
 
Ensuring implementation: 2008-09 
It was clear that the 2005 investigation had failed to identify the full extent of the 
problems and action taken to address them had been inadequate. In the 2007-2008 
investigation the first step was to fully analyse the causes of the corruption problem and 
why the response in 2005 had been ineffective in preventing ongoing corruption. The 
causes of corrupt behaviour are complex and the subject of much debate. Despite this 
complexity, or perhaps because of it, what became clear was that for any response to be 
effective in reducing corrupt behaviour a range of solutions had to be attempted to 
address the range of possible causes.5
 
 
One possible approach was to follow an approach pioneered by the Hong Kong ICAC 
which saw its role as extending beyond the investigation of specific cases to identifying 
structural factors that gave rise to corrupt behaviour by evaluating how work should be 
done, how it is actually done, and how it is controlled by managers. These structural 
factors include: policy weakness, inadequate instructions, unnecessary procedures, 
inadequate supervision, excessive discretion, unenforced laws and regulations, and 
misuse or abuse of position (Doig 1995:159). 
 
Another possible approach was suggested by a study of cases in 35 countries that 
concluded that a combined package of strategies was most effective in dealing with 
corruption. These strategies included: political will, new laws, new procedures, 
                                                 
5  Frank Anechiarico 1996 at 18-26 argues that there are layers of anti-corruption controls that have been 
added until the basic purpose of a regulatory body becomes ancillary to its corruption monitoring and 
control. New corruption controls do not do not displace old ones but rather they supplement them. 
Anechiarico argues that corruption controls implemented by law enforcement personnel has become the 
dominant approach in municipal government. These controls incorporating investigation, prevention and 
deterrence have become ends rather than the means to more effective governing. 
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enforcement, public awareness, prevention and accountability (Spector, Johnson & 
Dinino 2005). Of particular relevance to the Sutherland Waste and Cleansing Services, 
the Spector study concluded that the effectiveness of anticorruption programs should not 
be based on what worked elsewhere under different conditions. It argued against the ‘tool 
kit’ approach to reform in which “… good ideas are pulled ‘out of the box’ and expected 
to work. Whether they will work at all and how they might interact with each other are 
very complicated questions” (Spector et al. 2005:228).  Drawing on these conclusions, 
what was needed was a careful analysis of the causes of particular instances of corruption 
and a targeted practical response to each of those factors that were identified as 
contributing to the corrupt behaviour. 
 
This approach parallels one proposed by Sparrow for dealing with a range of ‘harms’ that 
might include poverty, disease, illegal drug trafficking, natural disasters, workplace 
accidents or corruption. He also advises against applying the regulator’s toolkit 
recommending instead that the tools used to control a particular harm be dictated by an 
understanding of its “dynamics and dependencies” (Sparrow 2008: 27). He suggests that 
regulators responsible for reducing harms should see them as individual problems to be 
solved - or knots to be undone - rather than simply the absence of their opposite. In the 
Sutherland Waste Services case, for example, the clearly unethical behaviour of the 
waste employees could not be adequately addressed simply by re-emphasising their 
ethical obligations.  
 
A Sparrow analysis of the action taken after the 2005 investigation might be that the 
agency had relied only on its ‘broad prevention program’ (or organisational integrity 
system) that aims to promote the good to be desired (general ethical behaviour) rather 
than attack the specific harm to be reduced (theft, misuse of resources, secret 
commissions, bullying etc) (2008:36-37). 
 
While this paper asks whether monitoring implementation of reforms is the critical 
prevention factor, it must be acknowledged that in the Sutherland case considerable 
efforts were also made to understand how and why the undesirable behaviour had 
occurred and become so entrenched. The causes of the recurring corruption uncovered in 
the 2005 investigation of Waste and Cleansing Services seemed to include: inadequate 
instructions; inadequate supervision; low risk of detection; discriminatory supervisory 
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practices; unchecked discretion; unnecessary procedures; unenforced regulations; and 
misuse or abuse of position; irregular and irrelevant training.  
 
This analysis of the 2005 investigation also suggested a number of other lessons. First, 
low level or minor corruption cannot be ignored because of its tendency to corrupt the 
organisational structure that in turn reduces the organisation’s ability to work effectively 
and achieve its goals. Second, just like a broken window was found to be a marker for an 
increased likelihood of individual crime, so low level corruption can be a marker for at 
least the potential for ongoing or more serious corruption to develop (Wilson & Kelling 
2003). In Waste and Cleansing Services, for the system of unauthorised waste collection 
to continue it needs to recruit and then corrupt other employees to ensure its survival. 
Third, because the corrupt behaviour continued after training in the Code of Conduct and 
despite the existence of process/supervisory controls, such measures are by themselves 
ineffective in reducing corrupt behaviour. More or different measures were clearly 
needed to deal with the recurring problems. 
 
After analysing the reasons for the failure of the 2005 investigation to uncover all the 
corrupt activity, the next step was to interview a large number of Waste and Cleansing 
drivers and supervisory staff about their experience of the corruption issues. The 
interesting point to emerge was the large number and diversity of complaints that many 
of the drivers had. These complaints included: unfair rostering, unequal pay rates, unfair 
pay bonus system, unfair distribution of work, use of casual drivers, inconsistent 
supervisory practices, inadequate training, inadequate performance reviews, bullying and 
favouritism. 
 
The investigation team realised that one further reason for the failure of the 2005 
investigation was the failure to identify the full extent of the problems and to limit the 
anti-corruption response to training and reliance on ineffective management controls. 
What was required was a precise analysis of the full range of problems and grievances of 
the drivers and a comprehensive response to address all of these issues. This process took 
some months and resulted in a lengthy investigation report with 55 detailed 
recommendations for reform. The recommended reforms were allocated to a number of 
senior managers for implementation. A system of reporting back and monitoring the 
progress of implementation was put into place to allow senior managers and the Internal 
Ombudsman to ensure implementation and judge whether the reforms were succeeding. 
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The entire process of investigation and implementation monitoring took over two years. 
Some of the training programs dealing with workplace culture are still continuing. 
 
A summary of the recommendations from the 2007-2008 investigation show the diverse 
and far reaching nature of the reforms that were recommended and implemented: 
• Appoint a senior manager to ensure implementation of the reform 
recommendations. 
• Intensive training and counselling of supervisory staff to change poor 
management practices to promote a team focussed approach. 
• Improved management of staff disputes and inter-personal skills. 
• Review of staff rosters, use of casual staff and the system of performance review 
of staff. 
• Review of overall communication mechanisms including regular workplace 
meetings and improved performance reporting. 
• Review of the payment of the productivity bonus, division of runs, more efficient 
use of staff at the end of their shift, taking meal or rest breaks, driver training, 
providing assistance to drivers for missed bins. 
• Improvements in recruitment, appointment and training of staff to make these 
fairer and more transparent. 
• Stricter driver training and annual licence checking. 
• Training and cultural change program to reduce the incidence of bullying and 
harassment. 
• Revised and more detailed reporting to allow better monitoring of the 
effectiveness of reforms. 
• Introduction of a totally revised corruption prevention training system based on 
regular workplace based meetings delivered by managers specifically designed 
to be relevant to staff. 
 
This revised ethics training program was designed to deliver training that was relevant 
and tailored to the identified needs of individual workers. Previously all staff were given 
similar ethics training based on informing staff about each individual council policy. This 
was found to be ineffective. The new ethics training program was based on a two level 
system. The first level gives several sessions of training to all staff on the general 
principles of ethics and good decision making contained in the council’s policies such as 
its Code of Conduct. Those nine principles are: Integrity, Selflessness, Objectivity, 
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Honesty, Accountability, Openness, Respect, Leadership, Economy and Efficiency. The 
aim of adopting this approach is to ensure that staff have a good understanding of the 
principles which form the basis of corporate policies on staff conduct and ethics. Its 
purpose is to allow staff to understand the type of behaviour expected of them and to 
differentiate proper from improper conduct.  
 
The second level is entitled ‘Management Assurance’ training. This is a decentralised 
training program of short (15 minutes) regular training delivered by local managers at the 
workplace. The local managers are provided with notes, training resources and support, 
and they provide regular briefings to staff in relation to new policy or other issues 
directly relevant to those employees at that workplace. This type of targeted training is 
designed to capture staff attention as it is short, focussed specifically on their needs, and 
is relevant. As it is delivered regularly it acts as a reminder to staff as to what ethical 
conduct and decision-making is expected of them. It is intended to overcome past 
criticism made by some staff that the previous training was too theoretical and not 
applicable to them in their workplace. This model of regular, short and tailored training 
is based on proven successful models of workplace occupational health and safety 
training used in Australia. 
 
3. Measuring and Evaluating the Reforms 
A review of the reporting and implementation of the reforms disclosed the following 
results. The great majority of reforms recommended by the 2007-2008 investigation were 
broad ranging. Rather than exclusively targeting corruption prevention, the reforms were 
designed to respond to the whole range of problems identified or perceived by the staff. 
The intention was that by addressing all the entrenched problems, in a holistic way, the 
entire work process would be improved including reducing corruption.  
 
The reforms have led to a complete revision of the way that the work is done, allocated 
and supervised. Waste truck drivers see the system of recruitment, rostering, work 
allocation, bonus payments and supervision as fairer and more structured. The perception 
of staff has changed to be more trusting and team based. The culture of the whole group 
has been changed so that corruption, bullying and harassment are clearly seen as 
unacceptable. Staff morale and skills have improved. After lengthy consultation 
agreement was reached with the drivers and unions to introduce GPS tracking and data 
logging devices on waste vehicles for safety and data collection purposes. This has 
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resulted in improved efficiency and an ability to pay productivity bonuses based on the 
work actually recorded as being done. All the reforms have resulted in increases of 
between 5-10% in revenue, commercial waste customer numbers and productivity by 
reduction of lost on-the-job time. There has also been a reduction of about 5% in 
operational costs. 
 
The key differentiating factors accounting for the failure of the 2005 investigation and 
the success of the 2007-2008 investigation seem to be attributable to: 
• the detailed analysis and identification of the causes of the corrupt behaviour in 
that particular work area;  
• a comprehensive response to all the problems identified by staff including the 
issues identified as contributing to corruption; and 
• the allocation of responsibility for the implementation of reforms to senior 
managers with a system of close monitoring and evaluation of effectiveness of 
the implementation.  
 
Addressing each of these factors requires attention to ‘little’ things that individually 
might seem insignificant but together contribute to a situation that is exposed to 
corruption risks.  
 
4. Related ICAC Inquiries 
Over the last 20 years failure to implement or monitor implementation of reforms has 
frequently been a factor in public inquiries reported by the NSW Independent 
Commission Against Corruption. Indeed, a study of the ICAC’s first 100 public inquiries 
found that this had been a factor in 40% of cases (Cooper & Mills 2007).  
 
Similar problems to those uncovered in the 2005 investigation into Sutherland’s Waste 
and Cleansing Services have also been found to occur in other waste collection 
operations.6
                                                 
6  The ICAC has conducted investigations and issued discussion papers addressing problems of corruption in 
local government cleansing and waste services. See ICAC Discussion Paper Taking the Whiff out of Waste. 
 An example is Liverpool City Council, which is a large local government 
area in the western suburbs of Sydney. An ICAC investigation of Liverpool City 
Council’s privately contracted waste services found that financial losses occurred 
because vehicles that should have been used for domestic waste collection were 
collecting commercial waste and charging the disposal fees to Liverpool Council (ICAC 
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2001). There were no checks on what the vehicles were collecting or on what charges 
were being incurred. Nor were there checks on waste disposal fees to reconcile these 
with the amount of waste being collected. The ICAC determined that Liverpool City 
Council had poor systems, inadequate monitoring and inexperienced staff. It lost 
significant amounts of revenue. The ICAC report concluded that risks for Councils in 
relation to waste collection and transportation generally include: 
• loss of revenue from fraudulent or negligent performance; 
• loss of reputation from poor service delivery; 
• damage to commercial and community credibility through inadequate 
monitoring; 
• damage to the environment from wilful or negligent waste disposal; and 
• damage to the recycling of waste policy from failure to properly differentiate 
waste products resulting in disposal of recyclable material. 
 
ICAC (2002) subsequently produced a discussion paper Taking the Whiff out of Waste 
that noted common allegations of corruption in the waste industry include: 
• misuse or theft of waste resources; 
• links between the waste industry and organised crime; 
• failure to make or keep proper records; 
• fraudulently altering waste weight records; and 
• bribery and collusion between interested parties. 
 
There is substantial money to be made operating outside the regulated industry, and the 
threat of detection is seen to be particularly low. ICAC concluded that government 
agencies are at risk of losing valuable resources through theft and misappropriation of 
valuable recyclable waste assets, as well as the loss of income from the fees they derive 
in providing waste services. Furthermore, it could also fall to the agency or council to 
contribute to the cost of remedying any environmental damage caused by illegal 
dumping. 
 
The ICAC has also investigated repeated allegations of bribery, corruption and fraud at 
RailCorp (a state owned railway corporation). It has conducted eight inquiries over 16 
years involving this agency in its various incarnations (ICAC 1992; ICAC 1993; ICAC 
1998; ICAC 2001; ICAC 2006; ICAC 2007; ICAC 2008a; ICAC 2008b). These 
investigations reported findings of corrupt conduct on the part of 31 individuals 
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including 14 RailCorp employees and staff of 16 private firms. The investigations 
exposed ‘endemic and enduring’ (ICAC 2008b:11) corruption involving employees and 
managers at many levels of the organisation. They uncovered fraud, bribery, improper 
allocation of contracts, unauthorised secondary employment, failure to declare conflicts 
of interest, false time sheets, and the cover-up of a safety breach. RailCorp employees 
were found to have improperly allocated contracts totalling almost $19 million to 
companies owned by themselves, their friends or their families, in return for corrupt 
payments totalling over $2.5 million (ICAC 2008b:5). Over 400 suggested criminal 
charges were referred for possible prosecution (ICAC 2008b:12). 
 
The ICAC investigation found that the structure of RailCorp and the way it operated 
allowed and encouraged corruption. Contracting and purchasing procedures, reporting 
processes and poor management controls were all found to contribute to endemic 
corruption. The ICAC concluded that: 
…the decision to outsource the provision of certain goods and services in an 
environment of dysfunctional markets, a lack of internal firewalls within 
procurement positions, the inability of management to effectively manage the 
procurement process, and the weak oversight by the RailCorp Board of an activity 
fraught with corruption risks, worked in concert to allow the widespread 
corruption to develop (ICAC 2008b:11).  
 
The investigations exposed widespread corruption in many levels of RailCorp from 
workers to senior managers. Corrupt employees seemed confident that they would not be 
caught. The ICAC inquiry heard intercepted telephone evidence of conversations 
between RailCorp employees showing that corrupt purchasing practice were continuing 
at the same time as evidence about the same type of corrupt conduct by other RailCorp 
employees was being heard by the inquiry and reported in the media.  
 
The investigations revealed serious and widespread management failures in the Asset 
Management Group (AMG) within RailCorp. These failures worsened the problems 
associated with the procurement process and assisted the continuation of corrupt conduct. 
Managers within the AMG failed to properly check the work of their staff, failed to take 
action to manage known corruption risks, and failed to ensure proper recordkeeping or to 
conduct proper checks. As a result, the ICAC inquiry found there was no credible threat 
of detection to act as a deterrent to prevent corrupt conduct (ICAC 2008b: 5).7
                                                 
7  Because of the size and seriousness of these management failures the ICAC made a number of 
recommendations to reduce the corruption uncovered by the investigation. These include the appointment 
of an external expert to develop and implement change in the AMG, a review of the responsibilities of 
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The ICAC reported preventing corruption in RailCorp was not a priority for the senior 
executive managers. It noted that whilst Railcorp had an Internal Audit unit which had 
identified problems including corruption, senior management had failed to implement its 
recommendations (ICAC 2008b: 56). In December 2006 the RailCorp Board 
commissioned Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu to undertake an independent review of issues 
brought to its attention relating to three individuals. The Deloitte report found that: 
 ... many of the procurement and contract management issues raised in this report 
were investigated and referred to the ICAC by RailCorp’s investigations and 
internal audit. We note however that had the recommendations made by the 
[Internal Audit] unit in several investigation and internal audit reports been 
effectively implemented, the need for further investigation and referral to ICAC 
may have been avoided (ICAC 2008b:56). 
 
The Deloitte report went on to state that: 
It appears that many of [Internal Audit’s] recommendations have not been 
adopted or are still in progress, despite the ongoing efforts of Internal Audit to 
persuade management of the importance and necessity of change (ICAC 
2008b:56). 
 
Thus the key lesson from both the eight ICAC RailCorp investigation reports and that of 
the independent Deloitte audit report, is that the explanation for the failure to prevent 
reoccurring corruption was the failure to implement identified recommendations. Had the 
recommendations been effectively implemented, the need for further investigations and 
repeated anti-corruption work may not have been necessary. This conclusion is similar to 
that reached in the Sutherland Waste and Cleansing Services case. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the light of these cases we answer the question posed in the title of this paper with 
three observations:  
• the causes of repeated corrupt behaviour or problems in a workplace need to be 
analysed in a specific, rather than generalised, way in their own context;  
• the proposed solutions need to target all the relevant behaviours occurring in that 
context; and finally,  
• the successful delivery of reforms aimed at reducing repeated workplace 
corruption, can be best assured by steady and persistent monitoring and 
                                                                                                                                     
managers in AMG and a continuous program of management training to improve management skills. The 
investigation made recommendations to improve significant gaps and deficiencies in RailCorp policies 
and procedures. These recommendations included: limiting secondary employment of RailCorp staff, a 
prohibition on the receipt by procurement staff of gifts and benefits from contractors and tenderers, and 
procedures to ensure that staff, contractors and subcontractors comply with RailCorp’s Statement of 
Business Ethics 
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implementation of the reforms recommended after careful investigation of the 
causes of corruption in that particular workplace. 
 
Further analysis is needed to understand why implementation of recommended reforms is 
ignored or, more often, abandoned. It may be that public organisations lack the necessary 
resources or skills. Possibly the contagious effect of low-level non-compliance is under-
appreciated or the limited capacity of supervisors to influence the behaviour of their staff 
is not acknowledged.  
  
There are also some fundamental questions to be answered about what kind of activity 
we are engaging in when we try to reduce the reoccurrence of workplace corruption. 
Should we look to research and analysis of prevention activities, such as workplace 
accidents? Alternatively, is it about encouraging compliance with rules which opens up 
an even wider body of comparable research? Does it require an understanding of the 
psychology of how we learn and apply ethical principles or virtue ethics? Or is it an even 
wider issue to do with ensuring the effectiveness of reforms or workplace change, in 
which case the organisational change and policy implementation literature would be 
helpful. Perhaps all of these are relevant and useful and should be applied in a 
combination that can be determined only by understanding the dynamics of the context in 
which the problem occurs.  
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